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CANONSELF HELP: How Immunology Might Reframe theEnlightenment
A. DAVID NAPIER
Programme in Medical Anthropology, University College London
Tat tvam asi
[That art Thou]
—Chandogya Upanishad 6.8.7
I. ILLOGICAL “SELF”
In 1960, Peter Medawar and F. MacFarlane Burnet were awarded the Nobel
Prize for Medicine for their groundbreaking work on immunity and the role of
“self” and “nonself” in maintaining and destroying organic integrity. Medawar’s
ideas on acquired immunologic tolerance developed from his demonstration that
mice “learned” to accept foreign tissue if injected with allogenic bone marrow at or
before birth—that is, that one could tolerate difference until defensive intolerance
was acquired.
Burnet’s contribution was that the body produced the protective antibody
(“defender” of “Self”—that is anti–foreign body) for recognizing a foreign invading
antigen (“Nonself”—that is, antibody generator); and that in so doing it failed
to recognize “self.” To put it simply, one’s defense mechanism worked by not
recognizing the self it protected.
By the early-1970s the idea that there was something called an “immune
system”was just beginning to take root in general practice, having only first appeared
in the scientific literature in the mid-1960s (Moulin 1989:221–222; 1991), which
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY, Vol. 27, Issue 1, pp. 122–137. ISSN 0886-7356, online ISSN 1548-1360. C© 2012 by
the American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved. DOI: 10.1111/j.1548-1360.2011.01130.x
cuan_1130 can2008.cls December 10, 2011 20:28
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
NONSELF HELP
is why, I would argue, its recent history is so important. This change was subtle but
significant; for the science of immunology moved away from an earlier, reactive
definition of itself that went far back into the 19th century to one now characterized
by protection through expulsion—an earlier belief that dramatic, hypersensitive
reactions (such as in anaphylactic shock) were “the unavoidable preliminary step in
the production of immunity” (Moulin 1989:232), now gave way to the idea that
immunity once acquired stood principally as a mechanism of defense and boundary
maintenance.
Immunology courses at medical schools have, since then, borne such titles as
“Identity: Microbes and Defense” As one leading introductory textbook puts it:
While normally acquired immunity is carefully regulated so that it is not
induced against components of “self,” for various reasons, when this regulation
is defective, an immune response against “self” is mounted. This type of
immune response is termed autoimmunity. . . .
In many cases, exposure to foreign substances results from clinical situations
in which tissue is transplanted or blood is transfused from one person to
another. . . .Rejection of the transplant or transfusion is not a manifestation of
some forceof naturedesigned to frustrate thephysician and thepatient.Rather,
such rejection occurs because of the central tenet of acquired immunity—
recognition and elimination of “not-self.” [Benjamini and Leskowitz 1988:10]
For several decades, the work of the early pioneers of this model defined
the rapidly growing field of immunology, while inspiring our present understand-
ing of transplantation biology. In the absence of a fully articulated and well-
understood immune system (which, to our surprise when we now look back,
first appeared in the literature only in the 1960s) no one could foresee that the
human “self” was now defended by a mechanism that could only function by not
“knowing,” or otherwise “recognizing,” the very “self” it was designed to look
after. Indeed, this may be immunology’s first and ultimate paradox of identity—
namely, how can a mechanism defend by not identifying the thing, the person,
defended?
In successive decades (followingMedawar and Burnet), several complex theo-
retical models emerged: the systemic network theory of Niels Jerne, the associative
recognition theory of Melvin Cohn, and the diversified cell theories of Talmage
and Burnet, to name some important examples. Through these and others, the
systemic nature of immune function became solidified, explaining the idea of im-
munologic “memory” and the logarithmic rate of antibody formation by showing
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:1
how molecules could quickly replicate on binding to an injected antigen. Through
evidencing such an orchestrated defense against what was viewed as a pathogenic
assault, the concept of the “immune system” became an acknowledged fact, even
though yet today its very existence remains based, to quote Melvin Cohn, the Salk
Institute’s dean of theoretical immunology and head of its Conceptual Immunology
Group, “on experimental systems of such great complexity that many interpreta-
tions are possible and reproducibility becomes a luxury” (Cohn et al. 1980; see also
Cohn 1992, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c]).
Almost overnight the killing and consuming concepts of pathogenic microbial
invasion took root in immunology even though at the time the nature of viruses
(which I will get to in a moment) was yet very poorly understood.
Indeed, despite early optimism about the explanatory usefulness of an im-
mune system structured to defend against invaders, the fundamental paradigm
of immunology—the recognition and elimination of “nonself”—has yet to re-
solve the field’s major concerns of autoimmunity, transplantation, and tumor
immunology (Carosella and Pradeu 2006, 2010; Carosella et al. 2006; Pradeu
2009; Pradeu and Carosella 2006). Indeed, “the self–nonself” model has created so
many intractable problems (e.g., Tauber 1991, 1994, 1999, 2000, 2003; Tauber
and Chernyak 1991) that theorists and bench researchers alike frequently suggest
that it ought to be put to rest (Tauber 1994), or replaced by a model in which
antigen-presenting cells (macrophages and dendritic cells) allow the body to be-
come “aware” of viral “danger.” This was, and yet remains, the contested view
of Polly Matzinger (e.g., Matzinger and Fuchs 1996; Schaffner 1997), one of the
most popularly acknowledged (e.g., Pennisi 1996) and most controversial of U.S.
immunologists.
There is still a fascinating book to be written specifically about how these
models were rapidly transformed between the 1960s and the newmillennium (see,
e.g., Eichmann 2008)—both about how notions of what viruses were evolved out
of the study of microbes, and about how immune systems models related in the
1950s and 1960s to the social information feedback studies of the Macy Foundation
being carried out by the father of cybernetics, NorbertWeiner, along with Harvard
sociologist, Talcott Parsons, and anthropologist, Gregory Bateson.
However,what is so oftenoverlooked throughout these debates overmodels of
immunity is the degree to which immunological identity hinges on culture-bound
notions of a wholly autonomous “self”—a concept made manifest in two basic
assumptions: (1) that organic integrity depends on the recognition and elimination
of biological difference (there would be no immunology without recognition and
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NONSELF HELP
elimination); and (2) that the notion of a prior andpersistent “self” is not contestable.
Overall, these premises converge on a singular assumption: that a “self” must
preserve its integrity through a protective mechanism. Were a “self” not salient,
persistent, and protectionist, that “self” would soon become, as Cohn himself once
reminded me, a toxic dumpsite.
Whilst the “recognition-and-elimination” model worked well for autonomous
biological pathogens (such as those bacteria and parasites which really do attack
us), we now know that defending the body against a viral “attack” is nothing like
defending it from invading organisms. Viruses need cells to achieve vitality, and
cannot attack without the life that autogenous, “self-made” cells (ones made by our
own bodies) bring to each and every viral encounter.
Furthermore, because immunity demands the ongoing and ever-changing ac-
quisition of tolerance to one’s own proteins, it is often argued by contemporary
immunologists who are dissatisfied with the self–nonself model that if, as we
now know, the self “is constantly being defined anew” through defensive anti-
body production and related acquired immunity, isn’t that another way of saying
“that it doesn’t really exist at all”? (Richardson 1996:5). In other words, if the
self is a prior and persistent Cartesian entity, then what we now know about
immunity makes its focus on self both misconstrued and inappropriate. Either
immunology is not about the self, or, if it is about selfhood, then that self is not
Cartesian.
II. A BASIC CONUNDRUM
If so much in immunology depends on what a “self” is, can what we have
learned from immunology, to reverse our terms, make possible a rethinking of our
time-honored concept of selfhood? Does immunology, to reverse or inquiry, tell
us something new regarding our cultural and historical assumptions about identity
and what it is that makes for a “self”?
Although good bench science depends on building on existing assumptions,
anthropologists can look toward other cultures for models of self and other; for
there are many examples (Hinduism being one famous one) in which body image
boundary is defined by a careful familiarity with, and a regulation of, new stimuli
that may in turn be helpful or harming.
Without providing the extensive inventory of possible models that a full
historical and anthropological assessment of these questions would require—a
thing, by the way, very much in need of being done—we may and should ask what
might be gained by such an inquiry.
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:1
Are other notions of “self” applicable in any way to theoretical immunology?
To answer this we need briefly to revisit the famous question of whether viruses
are living things; for we will see that the virus stands somewhere at the borders
of “self” and “nonself,” and is thus as much a conditioner and definer of a body’s
boundaries as it is a “single-minded attacker.”
A comparison of an excellent contemporary introduction to cellular biology
(Becker, Reece, and Poenie) and any of the early popular attempts at explaining
whether viruses are living things, reveals that our assumptions about the vitality of
the virus have changed little over the past 40 years; for despite the fact that viruses
have no mobility, we continue to describe them as if they do. Indeed, today’s texts
put the question aside as intractable:
“The question is sometimes asked whether or not viruses are living. The
answer depends crucially on what we mean by “living,” and it is probably
worth pondering only to the extent that it helps us more fully understand what
viruses are—andwhat they are not. Themost fundamental properties of living
things are mobility, irritability (perception of, and response to, environmental
stimuli), and the ability to reproduce. Viruses clearly do not satisfy the first two
criteria. Outside their host cells, viruses are inert and inactive. They can,
in fact, be isolated and crystallized almost like a chemical compound. It is
only in an appropriate host cell that a virus becomes functional, undergoing a
cycle of synthesis and assembly that gives rise to more viruses.” [Becker et al.
1996:105]
And because it is intractable, we continue to use volitional, intentional,
metaphors that encourage us to think of the virus as a living thing that can commandeer
a healthy cell, reduce it to a nursery, and reproduce itself at breakneck speed. But
how can a virus do such things if it is inert and without locomotion? How can viruses
recognize, scout, trick, discover, alert, evade, sense, recruit, mobilize, prod, mask, defend,
scavenge, attack, invade, adapt, appropriate, sacrifice, and kill (Napier 2003b:60) if they
lack mobility and do not respond to environmental stimuli? If these are mere linguistic
conventions, why should we continue to employ themwhen they are so inaccurate?
Here is a common example of the consequences of such conceptualizing made
famous by Susan Sontag in AIDS and its Metaphors (1990).1 It will resonate easily
with what most of us have been told:
The invader is tiny, about one sixteen-thousandth the size of the head of a
pin. . . . Scouts of the body’s immune system, large cells called macrophages,
sense the presence of the diminutive foreigner and promptly alert the immune
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system. It begins tomobilize an array of cells that, among other things, produce
antibodies to deal with the threat. Single-mindedly, the AIDS virus ignores
many of the blood cells in its path, evades the rapidly advancing defenders
and homes in on the master coordinator of the immune system, a helper
T cell. . . .
On the surface of that cell, it finds a receptor into which one of its envelope
proteins fits perfectly, like a key in a lock. Docking with the cell, the virus
penetrates the cell membrane and is stripped of its protective shell in the
process. . . .
The naked AIDS virus converts its RNA into DNA, the master molecule of
life. The molecule then penetrates the cell nucleus, inserting itself into a
chromosome and takes over part of the cellular machinery, directing it to
produce more AIDS viruses. Eventually, overcome by its alien product, the
cell swells and dies, releasing a flood of new viruses to attack other cells.
[1990:105–107]
Here is another example:
When faced with a foreign invader, the immune system mounts either of two
defenses.One, humoral immunity, involves primarily B cells. These white cells
recognize a particular antigen, then make antibodies that bind to that molecule.
The other depends heavily on T cells . . . that can destroy tumors and cells
infected with viruses and bacteria. These assassins, including natural killer cells,
become part of the cell-mediated immune response.
T helper cells are the sergeants that roust T or B cells into action. As helpers
form in the thymus, each becomes sensitive to just one antigen trigger. They
drift in the bloodstream or hang out in lymph nodes in a “naı¨ve” state until they
meet the antigen they were primed to recognize. At that moment, a helper cell’s
fate is sealed as either a TH1 or a TH2, or so some researchers think. If it
becomes a TH1, the cell then readies cytolytic T cells to do battle, generating
the TH1 response. As a TH2 cell, it initiates humoral immunity. . . .
These beneficial assassins can destroy a cell that has been tricked into harboring
pathogens where antibodies and TH2 components can’t get at them. [Pennisi
1994, emphasis added]
But if, on its own, a virus remains inert and without locomotion, why should
we privilege it with agency?Why should we in fact refer to viruses as foreign agents,
if a virus is lifeless outside a living cell? And if the floating virus is not an active
“other” to be defeated, what generates a so-called “viral attack”?Why, furthermore,
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:1
should the body’s bringing it to life be understood as primarily a defensive activity,
if a virus on its own is inanimate? Finally, if the so-called defensive antibodies we
create (and those proteins essential for identify foreign bacteria and viruses) are
de facto not coded for marking “self,” how can we see them at all as “self”—or a
defensive mechanism of “self”?
Might it be that our persistent characterizations of viruses as active agents,
arises partly from the cultural belief that harboring otherness within us is principally
dangerous, a belief whereby a persistent “self” must in turn always be protected
against things “foreign”? Although we all have cancer cells within our bodies, for
example, we never say we have cancer until those cells become problematic. In
fact, this ambivalence about, and concern over, things foreign within us is why,
until the arrival of stem cell research, studying the maternal–fetal was so often
unsatisfying for immunologists (Charlesworth et al. 1989).
To put things in perspective in an era of research now dominated by attention
to “uncommitted” embryonic stem cells, it is worth listening to a well-known
Australian immunologist’s view of the maternal–fetal only a few decades ago.
In 1975–76, the Nuffiled Foundation had supported the distinguished Australian
immunologist, Graham Mitchell, in what was hoped to be new, groundbreaking
work in this area. But this kind of immunology was unsatisfying for most immu-
nologists whose training emerged from the understanding of the invasive agents of
bacteriology and parasitology.
As Mitchell put it, commenting on this period of his research in the 1970s:
The maternal/foetal was a good idea, but we just didn’t have the techniques,
just didn’t have the way of approaching the question. It’s something which
a lot of people have actually got into for a short time and then got out
of—the immunological aspects of nature’s most successful foreign graft [i.e.,
pregnancy]—how the foetus actually survives inside the immunologically
hostile mother. We know she is responding to antigens from the foetus. So
we did a little bit on that and then got a couple of publications. But that was
a bad year. We had the idea and we thought, wouldn’t it be nice to have got
some money for it, and then we were under pressure to deliver on the money
we got from the Nuffield Foundation. . . .We weren’t into the field enough
and I must say we really didn’t get into the field because I got absolutely
seduced by host/parasite relationships. [Charlesworth et al.:214]
As a group of social scientists then studying Mitchell’s work pointed out, it is
clear that
128
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Mitchell’s own background, experience and contacts fitted him better for
research into the immunology of host/parasite relationships. He had no special
background in reproductive physiology [most immunologists didn’t prior to
the era of stem cell research] andwas unfamiliar with key techniques needed in
the foetal/maternal studies–as he [Mitchell] put it, “we were not particularly
good at tissue culture.” But he was au fait with the basics of parasitology: “I
didn’t [Mitchell claimed] have the hangup, which a lot of students do have,
of learning the list of fifty parasites and remembering the life cycles and
remembering what host they parasitize and so on. . . .That was behind me as
an undergraduate. A little bit of boning up and that’s all I needed for that.”
[Charlesworth et al.:214–215]
But Mitchell was far from alone at that time in being unsettled by the areas of
embryonic cell research that now dominate the science news media; embryology
had since World War II faded in importance as microbiology grew dramatically,
leaving immunology and virology to evolve alongside and out of the studies of in-
vasive agents and infectious diseases. Why do autoimmune symptoms often subside
in pregnancy? Why do woman have much higher rates of autoimmune infection (as
much a seven or eight times) than men? Might even childbirth itself, as immunol-
ogists often think, be understood in terms of immunological rejection? These are
today’s question more than yesterday’s.
But given them (perhaps precisely because of them),we should, I would argue,
persist in revisiting our earlier question: how can viral antigens be considered foreign
invaders if our own cells animate viruses? In Darwinian evolution there is no reason
for a healthy organism to seek out something that might harm itself, except when
in retrospect we call that encounter conditioning. And, because organisms do not
spontaneously endanger themselves in a “naturally selective” world, viruses must
at some level, it is assumed, be aggressive killers, even if they are actually inert
until brought to life by a cell.
There is, however, another possible view—namely, that antibodies are a key
to exploring the dividing line between self and other, a mechanism by which one’s
identity, as a living thing, becomes contested and eventually defined. Identity,
in this sense remains—to the considerable relief of immunologists—a prior and
persistent condition, but one that is now defined at the peripheries of selfhood
where it is contested and challenged. If we can accept such a view of identity
(one widely evidenced in the anthropological literature), there is only one logically
consistent and satisfying conclusion to be drawn: namely, if viruses need cells to
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:1
come alive, the so-called immune “self” (our antibodies) must attract, or otherwise
absorb those potentially pathological viral antigens. We know, that is, who we are
by the risky, dynamic, and sometimes painful process of discovering what we can
and cannot accommodate. “If you can’t stand the heat,” as Richard Nixon was so
fond of repeating ad nauseam, “get out of the kitchen”—survival, in this view, being
predicated on stepping forward, “taking the heat,” and hopefully doing something
with it besides caving in.
Although a completely different paradigm, the notion that antibodies absorb
potentially harmful bits of inert matter to transform (for better or worse) their
packaging of information actually makes good sense and withstands all logical trials
we might set against immunology’s major conundrums; for an antibody is the tool
that enables a living thing to explore the boundaries of life—to engage that danger
that is the precondition of real change—whether that change be life giving or
life taking. Although many may find the concept of inviting danger intolerable, in
some non-Western notions of selfhood it is considered both logical and coherent.
There are multiple anthropological examples of how self is made up and defined
by potentially dangerous encounters at one’s boundaries.2
III. NONSELF HELP: COMPATIBILITY RECONSIDERED
I have suggested how an alternative view of viral activation—one arising from
within cotemporary immunology—can reframe immunology’s former “paradox of
identity”; but what of its other more vexing paradoxes? Can this assimilative view
of viral life also reframe them? Let us briefly apply such an interpretation to two
other outstanding and famous paradoxes of theoretical immunology.
First, the Evolutionary Paradox (Silverstein 1989): How can the human body
continue to create a broad specificity repertoire—a wide range of “B”- and “T”-cells—when
natural selection would otherwise demand that apparently superfluous “deformations” be
eliminated?
The answer is that, in an anthropologically and historically informed model,
natural selection is no longer a problem because the body is creating possible
versions of “otherness” rather than mutations of “self”—that is, the bone marrow
(“B”) and thymus (“T”) cells explore “otherness” rather than defend “self”; for
the human body appears to produce an extraordinary number of antigen-inducing
antibodies (some threatening, some harmless). Indeed, estimates of the human
antibody repertoire run from 10 to the 5th to 10 to the 16th. And if these figures
weren’t already mind-boggling, “because most antigens have many epitopes [i.e.,
amino acids or sugar residues that are antigenic—‘outside’—determinants] and a
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given epitope can be recognized by more than one lymphocyte [response cells in
the lymph nodes], the number of lymphocytes that can respond to a given antigen is
much larger than the number of cells possessing a certain antigen receptor” (Becker
et al. 1996:788).
According to natural selection, these numbers should be naturally limited.
Superfluous creations should be eliminated. Bodies don’t, for instance, sponta-
neously generate organic variations in anticipation of unanticipated events. In evolu-
tion the body responds and adjust to stimuli; it does not create spontaneousmutants,
or at least does not do so as a function of health-enhancing activity. Saltation—
sudden and unexpected change—troubled Darwin; it was thought unnatural.
As, however, cellular diversity by definition proliferates in immunology, this
so-called “immunological repertoire” appears “paradoxical” to immunologists when
it creates mutants that have no apparent target. A body should not produce spon-
taneous, experimental deformities in anticipation of a single cellular mutation out
of millions on millions that might be useful for some future, unknown threat.
Furthermore, for binding to take place, an antibody must be created with a lock-
ing mechanism that works for an unknown antigen. This makes no sense either
because variation, by definition, is infinite—unless immunologists, as have some
evolutionary biologists, come to accept the possibility that antigens develop from
the nucleic acids of normal cell genes (i.e., out of the attenuated nucleic acids of
[as it were] “former selves,” or at least something very much like them).
If this connection between pathology and prior normality is posited, what of
antibodies—those mutations we generate in anticipation? Might they not be seen,
then, as creative attempts to engage risk at the borders of self? In numerous non-Western
models identity depends on just such a dynamic engagement. However, I refrain
from making the complex digressions that such an explication would necessitate,
but refer to the many examples of spiritual engagement, ritual warfare, and marital
customs described in the anthropological literature wherein the assimilation—the
vaccination—of “otherness” proliferates. Although elsewhere I discuss alternate
concepts of self at some length (e.g., Napier 1986, 1992:190–99; 2003b), suffice
it here to say that the anthropological literature is replete with examples not only
of how body-image boundaries may become transformed or otherwise malleable
but also where they position themselves to assimilate other selves or, as it were,
evolutionary “former selves,” as a means of establishing and negotiating identity
and body boundaries.
If natural selection is the parent of traditional immunological identity, cell
biology shows that there is nothing natural about selection, at least as it relates
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:1
to the benefits and drawback of encountering danger; for a self understood as a
“prior and persistent identity” can never ascertain in advance whether a selective
pressure is ultimately destructive or constructive. (Which is why, incidentally,
natural selection is so frequently accused of being teleological.) Therefore such a
“self” can only constantly attempt, as it were “selfishly,” to eliminate difference. The
result of this elimination may reflect the immunology we have inherited, but it will
not answer the contradictions of the field now being taken on by contemporary
immunology—contradictions whose resolutions shake the very foundations of
Cartesian thinking about what makes a “self” prior, persistent, and autonomous.
So much for the evolutionary paradox and immunology. But there is another,
equally famous, outstanding paradox that an assimilative view of viral encounters
resolves. This is what is known as the Repertoire Paradox (Silverstein 1989). And it
goes like this: How can we argue that the proliferation of B-cells and T-cells is adaptive,
when neither the size of the immunological repertoire, nor even the presence or absence of the
thymus (our major generator of immunity), can be construed as an indicator of resistance?
Some organisms do very well indeed with a quite limited repertoire; and it is
widely accepted that repertoire scope is only relevant to the number of potentially
pathogenic viruses that can influence an organism: one may not need a thymus at
all if there is no danger—no alienated variation of identity—no “similar,” “other-,”
or “former” self, as it were—being expressed.
Furthermore, “foreign” viruses and prokaryotes (those organisms whose DNA
is not contained inside a cellular nucleus), are not always harmful: some are innocuous,
others are realmutation–transformation factorieswithout a clearly defined “target,”
undermining the very notion that the body seeks always to rid itself of difference.
But identifying “nonself” need not be defensive in this new, immunologically,
and anthropologically informed model of “self”; for immunity can now be under-
stood more as a creative attempt to engage difference, than solely as a battle to eliminate
it. Here, immunity is less a system of protection and defense than a system of
information assessment, even of creation—for we survive through risking engagement
with difference—as so many new students of mirror neurons, for instance, are
eager to tell us.
Today, then, immunology sees itself quite differently, and I would argue
is well-positioned—perhaps better positioned than any other domain of modern
science—to help us rethink notions of the self that have dominated Western
philosophy at least since the Enlightenment; for it is with the Enlightenment that
we get the birth of scientific agnosticism and the first consistent argument for a
prior and persistent person that is not predicated on divine intervention.3
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Compare the “recognition and elimination” model of immunity with, for
instance, a recent Salk Institute discovery that certain skin cells with a hereditary
blood disease called Fanconi anaemia could be reengineered to revert to stem cells,
which could then be recommitted by use of a virus. What this means is that the
repaired cells—constructed by reverse engineering to a naive stem cell and then
as it were, reinfecting it—can now be used to replace the defective bone marrow
cells characteristic of a disease that also results in very low blood cell counts. A cure
becomes possible because, rather than suppressing immune responses, we reshape
them by encouraging and feeding novel viral information—information of a new
type that one day may well lead to therapies for what were once incurable genetic
disorders.
What made this possible, I would argue, is an unrecognized but giant leap that
has almost subconsciously become a core immunological precept—namely that
viruses do not invade us, but that we, for better or worse, bring life to the sometimes dangerous
encounters that define the limits of who we are, that limit what we can be, and that
(hopefully) do so without taking the very life that those viruses, once embodied,
now inform—or, as we used to say, infect.
Burnet’s antibodies, which recognize “foreignness” (“nonself”) but fail to rec-
ognize “self,” are now replaced by antibodies that function as “self” search engines—
search engines for the information (harmful or helpful) that sits latently in viruses like books
in a library.
If, as evolutionary biologists now widely suppose, pathogens evolve from
normal cell genes or entities much like genes (for how else can they bind with cell
surface receptors?), what our antibodies must be recognizing are as much aspects
of selfhood as aspects of foreignness. The difference made possible by this view is
neither subtle nor semantic; for it shows us that cellular antibodies risk bringing
life to alien viruses to revitalize these biologically binding—and therefore related,
even if dangerous—forms of “self” so as to adjust and respond to them. In this view
the “self” stands not only as something prior and persistent but also as a living thing
capable of constantly recreating and reclaiming its identity through engaging viral
information.
“Know your friends well, you enemies better.” Thus understood, the body
interacts with its environment in an attempt to create a new future. Burnet, who
said “it could be no other way” than for antibodies to fail in recognizing “self,” did
not suspect that there was another way of resolving immunology’s paradoxes—a
way that might change how we view the self and its environment. Part of this not
knowing was because of immunology’s evolving out of cell biology—where real
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organisms do attack one another. Part of this was because we needed molecular
genetics and stem cell research to demonstrate the real advantages of modifying
and loading cells over killing them off.
The alternative view outlined here, although not the last word on the immuno-
logical self, does provide an explanation by which immunology’s paradoxes can be
reconciled with what is known. If proven correct, it may or may not help reshape
scientific research, as it, however, seems now at the threshold of so doing; but it
will certainly force us to reconsider immunology’s contribution to the metaphysics
of human identity.
ABSTRACT
The classical immunological paradigm is predicated on the body’s ability to recognize
and eliminate “nonself.” However, the “self–nonself” model has yet to facilitate any
resolution of the field’s major concerns, and may thus prove to be of limited use.
Merely discarding it is no solution, as the juxtaposition of “self” and “nonself” persists
in research, in clinical settings, and in everyday practice despite the best efforts of
theoretical immunologists. Instead, the very conception of “selfhood” may prove to
be key. Replacing immunology’s prior and persistent “self” with less static concepts
derived from non-Western contexts not only resolves immunology’s famous paradoxes
but also offers a new and more accurate model that allows immunology to reframe what
may become an outmoded Enlightenment construct of “self.” In such a new paradigm,
immunology’s well-known system of protection and defense is replaced with a view in
which nonself becomes not only the body’s enemy but also its primary mechanism for the
creative assimilation of difference. This incorporative model—in which the “immune
system” functions more as a search engine than as an expeller of difference—both resolves
outstanding paradoxes, and complies more accurately with contemporary knowledge and
research practice. [medical anthropology, immunology, identity]
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134
cuan_1130 can2008.cls December 10, 2011 20:28
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
NONSELF HELP
2. See several examples in Napier 2003a, 2003b. On the idea that identity is defined at its
peripheries, see Fredrik Barth’s landmark Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization
of Cultural Difference (1969).
3. More specifically, I say “Enlightenment” because Descartes begins his own Meditations with the
claim that he is about to embark on his famous exploration of (self-) consciousness, and that
(like a modern-day “infectious” virus) he comes forth masked.
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